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 Martin Heidegger notoriously fostered the idea of truth (aletheia) as 
‘Being’ revealing or ‘unveiling’ itself in the world of humanity. ‘Meaning’ 
or ‘truth’ is revealed, not reached by argument. One might call this a way of 
viewing truth as inherent in reality, and capable of manifesting itself in an 
epiphany, albeit that for Heidegger, ‘it is the very fact that one is outside that 
makes possible the revelation of truth or meaning’.1 Similarly, structuralist 
theory sees meaning as inherent in the different systems it observes (e.g., 
linguistic, social, or cultural), and as manifesting itself in the ways the 
various elements in such systems interrelate. 
 
 As against such theories that propose an ‘internal solution’ to the 
grand question of ‘meaning’, one could cite other approaches that find no 
such ‘internal solution’ to the riddle of understanding any aspect of reality. 
The world remains permanently opaque, permanently incomprehensible. 
‘Being’ does not reveal itself, or articulate itself, or become itself. What 
instead is offered by such approaches is a belief in an ‘external solution’ to 
the incomprehensibility of the world, ‘external’ to the world itself, though 
clearly not ‘external’ to the divine Creator. 
 
 The difference between any ‘internal’ and any ‘external’ solution to 
the enigma of the world lies in the belief that truth – the truth that alone is of 
vital interest to us – is not so much a buried treasure to be hit upon within 
the confines of creation or a synonym for the laws of nature, in any or all of 
its branches, but is rather a connection between the world of the divine and 
the world of the creature. In recent times, Emmanuel Lévinas (‘from Being 
to the Other’) has, in the notion of ‘otherness’, highlighted the alternative, so 
to speak, to a fixation on ‘Being’. Not entirely surprising is his Jewish 
background, which he shares with many other recent figures, such as Martin 
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Buber, who also stressed in their thinking the dialectical or ‘diological’ 
principle, as it is often somewhat paradoxically termed, rather than any 
monistic rationalism. Not entirely surprising, because for Judaism, even 
more radically – seemingly – than for Christianity, God is other than and 
cannot be confused with his creation. Which still leaves God intact, and our 
world intact as his creation, and the possibility of a connection between the 
two. 
 
 If one accepts this sense of truth, there is naturally a price to be paid, 
which is that one will never know fully either this world or God, either here 
or anywhere else. Since, however, reality transcends understanding, it is 
presumably unaffected by our cognitive ‘gridlock’, and indeed may come to 
be seen as growing in attractiveness for this very reason. This should not be 
interpreted, needless to say, as an appeal to give up on reason or to glory in 
confusion. It is just another sign that the innocence of truth transcends even 
the cunning of reason. 
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